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1. Introduction 
The main implication of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) is that security prices fully 
reflect all available information at any given point in time (see Samuelson, 1965; Fama, 1970 
and 1991). One of the principal channels through which new information is released is via 
trading statement announcements (hereafter TSAs), the timing and content of which are in 
contrast to macroeconomic news announcements, controlled by managers of the firm. In a 
theoretical study, Shin (2006) generates predictions that associate voluntary disclosure in 
earnings announcements with disclosure risk, which seem to explain the short-term momentum 
and long-run stock return reversal; and further show that firms which have had a positive 
surprise in earnings have more volatile subsequent earnings than firms which have had a 
negative surprise in earnings. In this paper, we test Shin’s (2006) theoretical predictions in the 
optimal setting of voluntary TSAs in the Chinese stock market, in which managers have a high 
incentive to adopt a “sanitization strategy”.1, 2 We demonstrate that there is strong evidence in 
favour of the association of asymmetric post-announcement drift (hereafter, PAD) and the 
“sanitization strategy” hypothesis. We also demonstrate that the characteristics of the Chinese 
stock market affect the PAD in stock returns. In particular, the momentum and reversal pattern 
following a positive TSA is more pronounced for partially state-owned firms than for privately-
owned firms, a finding that confirms the hypothesis that managers of partially state-owned 
firms are more likely to adopt a “sanitization strategy” due to greater government support. This 
provides further confirmation of Shin’s (2006) predictions. 
One of the most pervasive anomalies in stock markets is short-term investor under-reaction to 
news and long-term price reversal (see Shleifer, 2000). In particular, a large body of literature 
(see Balakrishnan, Bartov and Faurel, 2010; Ayers, Li and Yeung, 2011) has shown that, 
following good news, stocks outperform immediately after the announcement. However, in the 
long-term, stock prices are found to overreact to news, hence stocks with a long history of news 
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announcements tend to exhibit low long-run average returns (see Narayanamoorthy, 2006). It 
is evident that the magnitude and pervasiveness of the PAD, i.e., the short-term momentum 
and long-term reversal in stock return, presents a sharp challenge to the EMH.   
One theoretical explanation of the short-term momentum and the long-term reversal in returns 
is offered by Shin (2006), where asset returns and disclosure risk are jointly determined. 
Disclosures convey information and resolve price uncertainty; however, the constant flow of 
information increases price volatility. Assuming that managers adopt a “sanitization strategy”, 
the probability that the firm will announce positive earnings in the next period follows a 
Poisson distribution. Hence, when the expected earnings increase, so does the volatility of the 
expected earnings.3 In other words, good news is expected to raise market expectations of 
short-term stock return volatility (i.e., in a period from one disclosure to the next) and reduce 
market expectations of long-term return volatility (i.e., in a period from one disclosure to the 
firm’s terminal date). Accordingly, short-term returns increase at the expense of long-term 
returns. The suppression of bad news also implies that a smaller short-term flow of negative 
information will have fewer informative disclosures and thus a lower price volatility; therefore 
stock returns following good news disclosures are expected to be more volatile than those 
following bad news disclosures. That is, as explained by Shin (2006), the drift phenomenon 
and the adoption of a “sanitization strategy” are the two sides of the same coin. 
The essence of Shin’s (2006) argument is further related to the credibility hypothesis 
documented in the empirical literature (see Jennings, 1987; Hutton, Miller and Skinner, 2003; 
Rogers and Stocken, 2005). The credibility hypothesis postulates that managers have an 
incentive to embellish good news, and to suppress the disclosure of bad news. We argue that 
this is more likely to occur in countries with weaker legislation governing security, and a lower 
risk of litigation. In such an environment, managers will tend to withhold bad news as much as 
possible; conversely, investors will view good news disclosures with scepticism, and regard 
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bad news disclosures as being more reliable. We therefore expect a smaller market overreaction 
following bad news disclosures. 
In this study, we investigate the PAD of stock returns following firms’ disclosures of positive 
and negative TSAs in the Chinese stock market during the period of 2002 to 2013.4 Motivated 
by Shin’s (2006) asset pricing model and the credibility hypothesis, we intend to address the 
notion that PADs are associated with managers’ disclosure strategy. Hence, we hypothesize 
that in an low-litigation risk environment (e.g., in a developing market such as Chinese stock 
market) where managers are more likely to adopt a “sanitization strategy” in information 
disclosure, PADs which follow the disclosure of good news are expected to be greater in 
magnitude, and more volatile, than PADs which follow the disclosure of bad news.   
We show that a pattern of short-term momentum and long-term reversal in returns exists for 
up to 250 trading days following the announcement of trading statements in the Chinese stock 
market. This finding is stronger for positive announcements relative to negative ones. Positive 
announcement PADs, measured by buy-and-hold abnormal returns (hereafter, BHAR), are 
stronger than negative PADs. The PAD variance, generated by the BHAR, is more volatile 
after positive announcements than negative announcements. Finally, we show that short-term 
momentum and long-term reversal is more evident for firms which are partially state-owned 
than for firms which are entirely privately owned. One possible explanation is that, in a 
developing market where the legal system is not rigidly applied, firm managers are more likely 
to adopt a sanitization strategy because of the expected low risk of litigation (see Bushman, 
Piotroski and Smith, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2006). The incentive is 
arguably stronger for firms that are under state ownership as they potentially receive more 
government support and hence are more likely to utilize a “sanitization strategy” in information 
disclosures (see Piotroski, Wong and Zhang, 2013). The cross sectional regression analysis on 
firms’ BHARs shows that state ownership significantly affects a firm’s BHAR in the short-
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term (i.e., 3 months after the announcement).5 Further, a characteristic unique to the Chinese 
stock market, the float ratio (the proportion of tradable shares in a firm’s capital), is also found 
to explain BHARs. Overall, our findings in the Chinese stock market are in-line with Shin's 
(2006) theoretical model and the credibility hypothesis. 
We contribute to the existing PAD literature in a number of ways. First, consistent with Shin’s 
(2006) predictions and the findings of the empirical literature (see, for example, Shleifer, 2000; 
Narayanamoorthy, 2006), we document a short-term momentum and long-term reversal in 
stock returns (i.e., PAD) following the release of trading statement announcements on the 
Chinese stock market. Second, we report an asymmetric momentum and reversal pattern. More 
specifically, the market reaction to good news is stronger and more volatile relative to bad news, 
a finding that further confirms Shin (2006) and the credibility hypothesis. Third, we use a more 
efficient proxy to capture earnings’ surprises (i.e., a firm’s voluntary TSA). Finally, we 
investigate the determinants of the PAD in the Chinese stock market and relate the PAD to 
market characteristics.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the empirical literature on the 
asymmetric response to good and bad news and the PAD. Section 3 presents the data and 
methods. Section 4 reports and discusses the results, and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Literature review  
There is a large body of empirical literature on the asymmetric market reaction to good and 
bad news (see Kothari, Shu and Wysocki, 2009, for a summary of the related literature). 
Skinner (1994) examines earning-related voluntary disclosures on the NASDAQ and finds that 
directors make pre-emptive bad news disclosures. In addition, bad news disclosures generate 
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larger stock price reactions than good news disclosures. The author argues that U.S. securities 
laws impose an asymmetric loss function on managers; announcements of large negative 
earnings surprises increase the likelihood of potentially costly stockholder lawsuits, but no such 
effect is associated with large positive earnings surprises. For the U.S. market, Chan (2003) 
reports a smaller PAD for stocks that release good public news relative to bad public news for 
up to 12 months after the scheduled announcement. Chen, Chiang and So (2003) show that 
negative news from the U.S. market causes a larger decline in stock returns compared to 
positive news of the same magnitude. The authors attribute this asymmetric phenomenon to 
the leverage effect. Kothari et al. (2009) also show evidence of an asymmetric post-
announcement drift; however they attribute this to managers’ deliberate delay in the disclosure 
of bad news. Soffer, Thiagarajan and Walther (2000) find that managers disclose bad news 
promptly (or early) but disclose good news gradually; hence firms with negative earnings 
announcements have lower excess returns in the period from just before the pre-announcement 
to just after the earnings announcement.  
For the Chinese market, Truong (2011) finds that negative earnings surprises generate a larger 
drift than positive earnings surprises, conjecturing that the asymmetric PAD is caused by short 
sale constraints. As the paper by Truong (2011) refers to the Chinese stock market, we need to 
point out the differences between our study and Truong’s (2011) study. First, while Truong 
(2011) uses the difference between the firm’s realized earnings and the median of earnings 
forecasts as a proxy of earnings surprise, we use the firm’s voluntary trading statement 
disclosures. Voluntary trading disclosures can exactly capture the ‘surprise’ element regarding 
firms’ forthcoming profit (see the description of trading statement in the following section). 
Second, Truong (2011) only investigates abnormal returns that are associated with extreme 
earnings surprises (i.e., the top 20% of the distribution of the absolute value of earnings 
surprises in the sample). In this paper, we look at a wider spectrum of TSAs. Finally, in contrast 
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to Truong (2011), we also investigate the PAD in the Chinese stock market and relate the PAD 
to the characteristics unique to the Chinese stock market, such as the percentage of state 
ownership and the fraction of tradable shares over the issuing firm's total shares outstanding.   
 
3. Data and methods 
3.1 Data 
One of the key variables of interest in this study is the proxy for an earnings surprise. In line 
with the theoretical proposition of Shin (2006), we rely on voluntary disclosures to capture the 
‘surprise’ element of a company announcement. In particular, since 2001 and in agreement 
with similar regulation in developed markets, the two Chinese stock exchanges - Shanghai 
Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange imposed the following trading statements’ rule: 
    Where to the knowledge of a company's directors there is a 
substantial change in the company's profit or in the performance of its 
business of Year 2001, the company must issue trading statements 
concerning the change within 30 workdays after the end of Year 2001. 
(Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange, 2001) 
Latterly, this rule has been extended to "quarterly trading statements". Positive and negative 
TSAs are released in the public domain with the uniform titles “expected profit increase 
statement” and “profit warning statement”, respectively. Therefore, positive (negative) TSAs 
refer to good (bad) news.  
We collect TSA data for the Chinese stock market from Wind Financial. Our dataset covers all 
quarterly TSAs from August 2002 to April 2013. We apply two filters. First, if firms have two 
sequential TSAs and the period between the two announcement dates is less than 12 months, 
then both TSAs are excluded to avoid an overlap of the event windows of the two events. 
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Second, we exclude TSAs that do not contain a full set of information in the regression analysis. 
The final sample contains 464 quarterly TSAs of which 99 are positive and 365 are negative; 
in terms of ownership structure, 302 TSAs refer to state-owned forms and 162 TSAs refer to 
privately-owned firms. Figure 1 presents the frequency of TSAs over the sample period. Data 
on the market capitalization of the firm, the percentage of the state ownership, and the float 
ratio6 of the firm are extracted from each firm’s annual or semi-annual financial statements 
prior to the TSAs in question. Together with daily stock prices and the market-to-book ratio of 
the firm, these data are provided by Wind Financial. FTSE Xinhua A2007 daily prices are 
extracted from DataStream. 
 
(INSERT Figure 1 around here) 
 
As we will describe in the Section 3.2, we transform the market capitalization of the firm (SIZE), 
the percentage of the state ownership of the firm (STATE), and the float ratio of the firm (FR) 
to the natural logarithm of their original values. Descriptive statistics of the final sample are 
presented in Table 1. The average value of MB on 60, 120 and 250 trading days after the TSA 
is 3.709, 3.478 and 3.66, respectively. As expected, the average value of SIZE, STATE and FR 
is relatively constant for up to 250 trading days after the TSA, which is 25.279, 4.442 and 4.605, 
respectively. 
 
(INSERT Table 1 here) 
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3.2 Methods 
We apply an event-study analysis. The timeline of the event study is described as follows: t(0) 
is the TSA announcement day; t(-1,1) is the announcement period which we use to measure 
the instant market reaction to information release;8 t(2, 60), t(2, 120) and t(2, 250) refer to the 
post-announcement event windows. To be in line with Shin (2006), “short-term” is defined as 
being from one quarterly TSA date to the next (i.e., from the event day 0 to 60); “long-term” 
is defined as one quarter after the TSA date (i.e., from the event day 61 to 250). Since TSAs 
are assumed to have a long-term effect on stock prices, we apply a buy-and-hold abnormal 
return strategy to measure the impact of TSAs on stock returns (see Barber and Lyon, 1997).  
The BHAR of stock i over the period (τ1, τ2) is estimated as 
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where N is the number of events. To test the null hypothesis that ),( 21 BHAR is significantly 
different from zero, the t-statistic is suggested in Brown and Warner (1980) and Campbell, Lo 
and Mackinlay (1997): 
 
NBHARBHARt /][/ ),(),( 2121    
(3) 
                         
where ][ ),( 21  BHAR is the standard deviation of the estimated ),( 21 BHAR over the sample 
event stocks. 
Further, we investigate whether the asymmetric PAD can be explained by the unique 
characteristics of the firm structure of Chinese listed firms. Since the Chinese stock market 
started trading in 1990, large state-owned enterprises have gone public through the stock 
market. From April 2005 to 2007, the Chinese stock market went through a further privatization 
reform which is referred to as the "share conversion" which aimed to reduce the non-tradable 
state ownership of listed firms. By the end of 2012, the state-owned shares still accounted for 
9.89% of total market capitalization and the tradable shares accounted for 74% of the total 
market capitalization.10 We estimate the following cross-sectional regression model to analyze 
the potential driving forces of local market characteristics to asymmetric PADs: 
 
iiiiiii FRSTATESIZEMBTSABHAR   ),,,,(),( 21  
(4) 
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where TSA takes the value of one for positive TSAs and zero for negative TSA; MB is the 
market-to-book ratio; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm; 
STATE is the natural logarithm of the percentage of the state ownership of the firm; FR is the 
natural logarithm of the firm’s float ratio. STATE and FR are unique to Chinese stock market. 
Size and market-to-book ratio, i.e., MB and SIZE, are well-known predictors of the cross-
section of stock returns (see Fama and French, 1992 and 1993). We examine the average BHAR 
in three post-announcement periods: t(2,60), t(2,120) and t(2,250).  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 PAD to good news vs bad news 
We report the PAD for up to one year (i.e., 250 trading days) following a TSA. In addition, we 
report the results for the whole TSA sample and also partition the sample into four sub-samples 
according to the following considerations. First, in-line with the literature, we partition the 
sample to positive and negative trading statement surprises. Second, we expect that the state 
character of partially state-owned firms may have an effect on the managers’ ability to withhold 
negative news and also on the way the market reacts to news generated by partially state-owned 
firms. In Table 2 we present the estimated average BHARs for the whole TSA sample and the 
sub-samples in the immediate announcement period t(-1,1), and the short-term of t(2,60) and 
the long-terms of t(2,120) and t(2, 250) in the post-announcement periods. In total, there are 
66 (236) positive (negative) TSAs for the partially state-owned firms and 33 (129) TSAs for 
the privately-owned firms.  
 
(INSERT Table 2 here) 
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For the immediate announcement period t(-1,1), the average BHAR is 2.887% for positive 
TSAs and -4.416% for the negative TSAs. Both figures are highly significant, implying that 
the market reacts with a significant sharp rise (fall) to good (bad) news in the immediate 
aftermath of a TSA. For positive TSAs, the average BHAR continues to rise in the short-term, 
i.e., the average BHAR is 7.214% at 5% significance level for the period t(2,60).  The BHAR 
becomes insignificant and is reduced to 3.682% and -1.139% in the long-term for  t(2,120) and 
t(2,250), respectively. This inverse U-shaped pattern for positive TSAs indicates a short-term 
momentum and long-term reversal that is well-documented in the literature (see Foster, Olsen 
and Shelvin, 1984; Shin, 2006). For negative TSAs, the average BHAR is 0.515%, -0.487% 
and 2.208% in the post-announcement periods of t(2,60), t(2,120) and t(2,250), respectively. 
Although the average BHARs remain insignificant in the post-announcement periods, these 
results are some evidence that the market reverses quickly in the short-term.  
Move on to the results of the sub-samples of partially state-owned firms and privately-held 
firms. Table 2 shows that, for the partially state-owned firms, the PAD exhibits a clear pattern 
of short-term momentum and long-term reversal. The average BHAR for positive TSAs is 
3.148%, 6.893%, 0.523% and -13.233% in the event windows of t(-1,1), t(2,60), t(2,120) and 
t(2,250), respectively. The results are significant for the immediate announcement period t(-
1,1), but remain insignificant for longer intervals. The average BHAR rises to its peak around 
one quarter after the announcement, and falls afterwards. This finding implies that, after an 
upward short-term momentum following the disclosure of good news, the market reverses in 
the long-term (i.e., up to one year following the TSA announcement), and even becomes 
negative one year following the announcement. For the negative TSAs of partially state-owned 
firms, the market reaction is strong and significant on the immediate announcement period t(-
1,1) with an average BHAR of -4.806%, before it quickly rebounds and becomes close to zero 
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for the subsequent periods. For the privately-owned firms and the immediate announcement 
period t(-1,1), the results are similar to those of the whole TSA sample and highly significant. 
However, for positive TSAs, the PAD continues to rise for the entire post-announcement 
periods, albeit significance is retained in the short-term following the TSA. In contrast, the 
reversal for the negative TSAs is retained for the entire post-announcement period but remains 
insignificant.  
Further, there is a distinctive difference in the magnitude of the market reaction to good and 
bad news. Table 2 demonstrates that for the whole sample, the magnitude of the average 
BHARs of positive TSAs in the post-announcement periods are greater than those of negative 
ones, except for the period t(2,250). When looking at the sub-samples of partially state-owned 
firms and privately-owned firms, the magnitude of the average BHARs of positive TSAs are 
greater than those of negative ones in all the post-announcement periods. These findings imply 
that the stock market reaction to good news is stronger than bad news in the post-announcement 
period.     
In order to visualize the patterns of PADs we described above, in Figures 2 to 4 we plot the 
daily average BHAR, separately for positive and negative TSAs for the event window t(-1, 250) 
and also separately for the whole sample, for the sub-samples of partially state-owned firms 
and privately-owned firms. Figure 2 shows that, for the whole sample, the momentum of 
BHAR to positive news lasts for approximately 60 trading days (i.e., in the short-term), peaks 
at around 16% and subsequently reverses to zero approximately 190 trading days after the TSA. 
The average BHAR of negative TSAs is relatively stable at 2% for a period of approximately 
100 trading days and it reverts to zero in the long-term. For partially state-owned firms, Figure 
3 shows a similar momentum and reversal effect following positive TSAs, however it becomes 
clear that return reversal is much more pronounced compared to Figure 2 - the average BHAR 
becomes negative approximately one year after the TSA. The average BHAR following 
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negative TSAs is still more stable than that following positive TSAs in the post-announcement 
periods. Figure 4 shows that for privately-owned firms, the momentum is sustained for a much 
longer period and there is an asymmetric reaction to good news and bad news - while the PAD 
of positive TSAs exhibits an upward drift in the year after the announcement, the PAD of 
negative TSAs is relatively stable and close to zero, particularly before in the first 200 post-
announcement days.  
 
(INSERT Figures 2-4 around here) 
 
In summary, Table 2 and Figures 2 to 4 show a pronounced PAD following trading statement 
announcements. However, two distinctive features arise: first, the short-term momentum and 
long-term reversal is more pronounced for good news than for bad news; second, the effect is 
more pronounced for partially state-owned firms than privately-owned firms. This further 
confirms Shin (2006) that the asymmetric drift is more pronounced when firms are more likely 
to withhold bad news. Figure 2 clearly shows that in the long-term, the fall in BHARs for good 
news is higher than the rise in BHARs for bad news. This pattern is also reflected numerically 
in Table 2, in particular for partially state-owned firms. 
In Table 3, we estimate the variance of the average BHAR for each TSA-specific and firm-
specific group for the post-announcement periods of t(2,60), t(2,120) and t2,250). We use an 
F-test to test the hypothesis that within each of the three groups (i.e., all firms, partially state-
owned firms and privately-owned firms), the variance of average BHAR for positive TSAs is 
greater than the variance of the average BHAR for negative TSAs in the same post-
announcement period. For the whole sample, Table 3 shows that the variance of negative TSAs 
is significantly greater than the variance of positive TSAs for all the short- and long-term post-
17 
 
announcement periods. Similar results are found even when we split the sample into partially 
state-owned firms and privately-owned firms. In particular, partially state-owned firms exhibit 
a higher variance relative to privately-owned firms in all the post-announcement periods. This 
finding implies that state-ownership might cause a more volatile PAD following the disclosure 
of good news than bad news in a manner similar to the one discussed in Table 2. 
 
(INSERT Table 3 here) 
 
Overall, our findings confirm Shin's (2006) predictions where the drift phenomenon and the 
adoption of a “sanitization strategy” are the two sides of the same coin. We conjecture that the 
above findings hold in a developing market such as the Chinese stock market, in which the 
legal system is not rigidly applied and the chance that stockholders may sue managers when 
there are large stock price declines on earnings announcement days is low (see Bushman et al., 
2004; Piotroski et al., 2013; La Porta et al., 2006). Since low expected legal costs make 
managers more likely to adopt a sanitization strategy, we expect that the latter is particularly 
true for firms that are partially owned by the government, who may potentially receive more 
government support. We show that, under the assumption of the adoption of a “sanitization 
strategy” by firm managers, the PAD to TSAs exhibit short-term momentum and long-term 
reversal. Furthermore, the market reaction to positive TSAs is stronger than negative TSAs, 
with a greater variance of BHARs for positive TSAs relative to negative TSAs. As 
hypothesized, these findings are particularly true to partially state-owned firms as those firms’ 
managers are more likely to supress bad news. Our findings are opposite and confirm the results 
found for the developed markets where legal costs of withholding bad news are high and a 
“sanitization strategy” is less likely to be pursued by managers (see Skinner, 1994; Collett, 
2004; Chen et al., 2003; Kothari et al., 2009). 
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4.2 Determinants of PAD  
To further investigate whether the asymmetric PAD of TSAs is caused by the unique 
characteristics of Chinese firms, such as the level of state ownership and the proportion of 
untradeable shares embedded in a firm’s capital structure, we estimate the cross sectional 
regression of Equation (4) separately for the two groups in our sample (i.e., partially state-
owned firms and privately-owned firms) and for the three post-announcement windows. The 
cross-sectional regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors to adjust a 
minor violation of residuals normality. The results are presented in Table 4. 
 
(INSERT Table 4 here) 
 
In the short-term (i.e., t(2, 60)), the estimated coefficients of TSA are uniformly positive for 
both groups. In the long-term, (i.e., t(2,120) and t(2,250)),11 the estimated TSA coefficients are 
still positive for privately-owned firms but are negative for partially state-owned firms. 
Significance is established at 5% for partially state-owned firms in t(2,250) only. The result 
provides some evidence that, in the short-term, positive TSAs lead to a higher BHAR than 
negative TSAs irrespective of a firm’s ownership structure; however, in the long-term, the 
market reverses for partially state-owned firms but not for privately-owned firms, in which 
positive TSAs disclosed by partially state-owned firms result in a lower BHAR compared to 
negative TSAs. The coefficient of state ownership in a firm’s capital structure (STATE) has a 
significantly negative impact on the firm’s BHAR in the short-term of t(2,60) for the partially 
state-owned firms, but this impact becomes positive and insignificant in the longer post-
announcement periods. This result (alongside the results in Table 3 and Figures 3 and 4) 
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confirms that state ownership is associated with a more profound pattern of asymmetric PAD 
compared to privately-owned firms. This is due to the fact that state-owned firms’ managers 
are more likely to employ a “sanitization strategy” taking advantage of possible government 
support. Crucially, the higher level of state ownership in the firm leads to lower BHAR, as 
indicated by the negative coefficient of STATE. As firms with higher level of state-owned 
shares will potentially receive more government support, this can dilute the consequences of 
the disclosures; the market reaction to disclosures from state-owned firms is less strong. This 
is also quantitatively reflected in Table 2. 
In most of the cases, the proportion of tradable shares (FR) in a firm’s capital structure has a 
significantly positive impact on the firm’s BHAR during the short- and long-term for the two 
groups of firms. This implies that the asymmetric market reactions to good and bad news is, to 
some extent, caused by the unique capital structure of Chinese firms. The estimated coefficients 
of the control variables of market-to-book ratio (MB) and firm size (SIZE) are positive and 
significant in most of the post-announcement periods for both firm groups.12      
                                  
5. Conclusion 
One of the most pervasive anomalies in stock markets is short-term investor under-reaction to 
news and long-term price reversal (see Shleifer, 2000). However, there are only a handful of 
studies that shed light on the asymmetric PAD to good news and bad news, and most of these 
studies find that market reaction to bad news is stronger than it is to good news. Motivated by 
Shin (2006), we examine the asymmetric PAD in the Chinese stock market where a sanitization 
strategy is more likely to be adopted by managers due to insufficient securities law and low 
litigation risk.    
We show that the short-term momentum and long-term reversal in stock returns exists for up 
to 250 trading days following the quarterly announcements of trading statements in the Chinese 
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stock market. This finding is stronger for positive announcements relative to negative ones. 
The magnitude and the variance of the positive announcement PADs, measured by a buy-and-
hold abnormal return strategy, are stronger than negative PADs. This is particular true for firms 
with state-owned shareholders. By controlling for the size and market-to-book effect, the cross 
sectional analysis shows that state ownership can explain a firm’s BHAR for up to 3 months 
after a TSA; the float ratio can explain a firm’s BHAR for up to one year after the 
announcement.  
We contribute to the PAD literature in a number of ways. First, consistent with Shin’s (2006) 
predictions and the findings of the empirical literature (see, for example, Shleifer, 2000; 
Narayanamoorthy, 2006), we document a short-term momentum and long-term reversal in 
stock returns (i.e., PAD) following the release of trading statement announcements in the 
Chinese stock market. Second, we report an asymmetric momentum and reversal pattern. More 
specifically, market reaction to good news is stronger and more volatile relative to bad news, a 
finding that further confirms Shin (2006) and the credibility hypothesis. Third, we use a more 
efficient proxy to capture earnings’ surprises (i.e., a firm’s voluntary TSA). Finally, we 
investigate the determinants of the PAD in the Chinese stock market and relate the PAD to 
market characteristics. 
Our findings show that the asymmetric PADs between good and bad news is strongly 
associated with the firm’s disclosure strategy. In a developing market where litigation risk is 
low (e.g., the Chinese stock market), managers are more likely to withhold bad news, causing 
the market to react more strongly to good news than to bad news. The latter is in line with the 
empirical literature that transparency and the incentive to suppress negative information are 
strongly related to a country’s legal/judicial regime and political career concerns (see Bushman 
et al., 2003; Piotroski et al., 2011). Partially state-owned firms potentially receive more 
government support and thus managers are more likely to withhold bad news, and that may 
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explain why asymmetric PADs for partially state-owned firms are more pronounced than that 
for privately-owned firms. Our findings are consistent with Shin's (2006) theoretical model and 
lend support to the credibility hypothesis that bad news is more reliable, and therefore not 
expected to generate strong investor under-reaction compared to good news.   
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the variables in Equation (4). MB refers to 
the market-to-book ratio, SIZE refers to the natural logarithm of the market 
capitalization of the issuing firm, STATE refers to the natural logarithm of the 
percentage of the firm’s state ownership, and FR refers to the natural logarithm of the 
fraction of the market value of tradable shares over the total market value of the firm. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Event day t=60        
MB 3.709 5.023 -25.990 34.454 
SIZE 21.285 0.942 19.056 25.756 
STATE 3.384 1.093 -6.502 4.442 
FR 3.879 0.501 1.609 4.605 
          
Event day 
t=120 
        
MB 3.478 5.421 -38.440 44.145 
SIZE 21.259 0.959 18.854 25.734 
STATE 3.384 1.093 -6.502 4.442 
FR 3.898 0.511 1.609 4.605 
          
Event day 
t=250 
        
MB 3.660 6.144 -37.042 33.390 
SIZE 21.265 1.042 18.747 25.279 
STATE 3.384 1.093 -6.502 4.442 
FR 3.909 0.519 1.419 4.605 
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Table 2. Average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
This table reports the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the on- and post-trading-
statement-announcement (TSA) periods of (-1,1), (2,60), (2,120) and (2,250), where the event day is defined 
as day 0. The average BHAR is given by Equations (1) and (2), and is equivalent to the average of individual 
firm’s excess stock returns (i.e., individual firm’s stock return subtracted by market index return); positive 
TSA refers to the TSA with the title “expected profit increase statement” disclosed by individual firms; 
negative TSA refers to the TSA with the title “profit warning statement” disclosed by individual firms; 
partially state-owned firms refer to firms have both state ownership and private ownership; privately-owned 
firms refer to firms have private ownership only. The t-test null hypothesis: BHAR is significantly different 
from zero. The t-statistics appear in italics. *** and ** refer to 1% and 5% significance level, respectively.  
Event windows 
All firms Partially state-owned 
firms 
Privately-owned firms 
(in  day) 
Positive 
TSAs  
Negative 
TSAs 
Positive 
TSAs 
Positive 
TSAs  
Negative 
TSAs 
Positive 
TSAs 
(-1,1) 2.887 -4.416 3.148 -4.806 2.363 -3.702 
 6.722*** -18.970*** 5.591*** -16.202*** 3.769*** -10.101*** 
(2,60) 7.214 0.515 6.893 -0.212 7.857 1.845 
 2.235** 0.351 1.530 -0.108 2.163** 0.884 
(2,120) 3.682 -0.487 0.523 -0.953 10 0.365 
 0.999 -0.254 0.113 -0.365 1.653 0.142 
(2,250) -1.139 2.208 -13.233 -0.58 23.047 7.309 
 -0.168 0.666 -2.036** -0.145 1.538 1.246 
No. of TSs 99 365 66 236 33 129 
 
                          
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Variances of the average BHARs  
This tables reports the variances of the average buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) in the post-trading-
statement-announcement (TSA) periods of (2,60), (2,120) and (2,250), where the event day is defined as day 0. 
The variables BAHR, positive TSA, negative TSA, partially state-owned firms and privately-owned firms are 
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defined in Table 2. The F-test hypothesis: the variance of the average BHARs of positive TSAs is greater than 
that of negative TSAs. The F-statistics appear in italics. ***, ** and * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance level, 
respectively. 
Event 
windows 
                  All firms 
Partially state owned 
firms 
         Private firms 
Positive 
TSs  
Negative 
TSs  
Positive 
TSs  
Negative 
TSs  
Positive 
TSs  Negative TSs  
(2,60) 3.754 0.590 4.075 0.322 3.721 1.854 
F-stat 6.368***  12.666***  2.008**  
(2,120) 8.439  23.457 0.774 7.413 2.047 
F-stat 4.938***  11.128***  3.576***  
(2,250) 8.439  23.457 2.529 20.403 2.373 
F-stat 8.439***  23.457***  1.663*  
No. of TSs 99 365 66 236 33 129 
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Table 4. Estimates of Equation (4)  
This table reports the estimates of Equation (4) in the post-trading-statement-announcement (TSA) periods of (2,60), (2,120) and (2,250), where the event day is 
defined as day 0. TSA refers to the dummy variable that takes the value of one for positive TSAs and zero for negative TSAs. Variables MB, SIZE, STATE and FR 
are defined in Table 1; the variables BHAR, positive TSA, negative TSA, partially state-owned firms and privately-owned firms are defined in Table 2. T-statistics 
appear in italics. ***, ** and * refer to 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels, respectively.  
Event windows  (2,60) (2,120) (2,250) 
Dependent 
variable= BHAR 
(%) 
Partially state- 
owned firms 
Privately-owned 
firms 
Partially state- 
owned firms 
 Privately-owned 
firms 
Partially state- 
owned firms 
Privately-owned 
firms 
TSA 3.706 6.425 -2.041 8.939 -13.703 15.804 
 0.80 1.53 -0.42 1.36 -1.91** 1.09 
MB 0.922 0.514 1.017 0.204 3.063 1.831 
 2.63*** 1.63* 1.94* 0.57 3.78*** 2.03** 
SIZE  11.936 2.948 13.887 5.851 17.826 24.627 
 3.51*** 1.62* 5.74*** 2.26** 5.45*** 4.39*** 
STATE  -2.285 - 1.578 - 0.706 - 
 -1.66* - 0.91 - 0.25 - 
FR 8.000 7.057 22.006 11.014 28.526 4.503 
 1.61 2.24** 4.14*** 2.38** 3.88*** 0.33 
cont. -277.731 -93.083 -381.989 -171.37 -497.950 -547.128 
 -4.12*** -2.35** -7.00*** -3.38*** -6.24*** -5.57*** 
R-squared (%) 18.51 7.47 20.96 10.56 27.55 20.87 
No of obs. 302 162 302 162 302 162 
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Figure 1. The frequency of the trading statement announcements (TSAs) in the sample period 2002-
2013. 
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Figure 2. The average BHARs of the whole positive and negative TSAs samples in event window 
(-1,250), where the event day is defined as day 0. The variables BHAR, positive TSA and negative TSA 
are defined in Table 2. 
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Figure 3. The average BHARs of positive and negative TSAs for partially state-owned firms in event 
window (-1,250), where the event day is defined as day 0. The variables BHAR, positive TSA, 
negative TSA and partially state-owned firms are defined in Table 2. 
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Figure 4. The average BHARs of positive and negative TSAs for privately-owned firms in event 
window (-1,250), where the event day is defined as day 0. The variables BHAR, positive TSA, 
negative TSA and privately-owned firms are defined in Table 2. 
 
 
 
 
1 A disclosure is “sanitized” by removing bad news and keeping good news only. This is a metaphor for the way 
in which managers use their discretion to present news to the market (see Shin, 2006). 
2 In a corporate governance context, Piotroski et al. (2013) for Chinese companies, and Bushman et al. (2004) for 
a number of industrial countries, demonstrate that transparency and the incentive to suppress negative information 
are strongly related to both a country’s legal/judicial regime and to political career concerns. 
3 Recall that the mean of a Poisson random variable is also its variance. 
4 The Chinese stock market refers to both, the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.  
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5 In other words, the level of state ownership significantly increases the stock price (i.e., firm value) in the short-
term.  
6 Float ratio is the ratio between the market value of tradable shares and the total market value of the firm, where 
tradable shares exclude state-owned shares and legal person shares due to the fact that state-owned shares and 
legal person shares are untradeable in the open market. Legal person shares are those owned by domestic 
institutions, including non-bank financial institutions and SOEs that have at least one non-state owner. 
7 FTSE Xinhua A200 index is the large cap A-share index constructed out of the top 200 companies (ranked by 
market capitalization) in the FTSE Xinhua Index Series. 
8  The announcement window includes the day before and after the announcement day due to the possible 
information leakage before the announcement, and the fact that some TSAs are released to the public after the 
stock market closes on the announcement day. 
9 Using stock prices, P𝑖, and market index prices, P𝐹𝑇𝑆𝐸 , Equation (1) can be expressed as 
1
2
1
2
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which is equivalent to excess stock returns, i.e., stock returns less the market index returns. 
10 See Shanghai Stock Exchange Factbook 2013 and Shenzhen Stock Exchange Factbook 2013.  
11 We drop two outliers in the regression for the subsample of partially state-owned firms on event window (2,250) 
in which the regression residual is greater than 350, and one outlier in the regression for the subsample of 
privately-owned firms on event window (2,250) in which the regression residual is greater than 400.  
12 Following a suggestion made by a referee, we have also estimated a model of Equation (4) involving the 
interaction terms between TSA and the other independent variables for the group of partially state-owned firms 
the group of privately-owned firms. The results show that the estimated coefficients of the interaction terms are 
in general insignificant, while the estimated coefficients of TSA are significant for partially state-owned firms in 
the long-term. This implies that good news has a different intercept to bad news, but has similar slopes of MB, 
SIZE, STATE and FR as bad news. To conserve space, we do not report this table (available upon request).  
 
